



VEROSINT

Improving Account Security with ITDR


Bertold Kolics

LASCON, Austin, TX
October 23, 2025

About Me





- Testing specialist
 - LDAP, SCIM, Identity Provisioning in past
- Advocate for [Modern Testing Principles](#)
- News flash - October 14, 2025
 - [Imprivata acquires Verosint](#)
- [Verosint](#) - software vendor
 - Detect & prevent online account fraud
- Slides: <https://bertold.kolics.net/pages/>



Event						
TIME	RISK SCORE	ANOMALY SCORE	EVENT	ACCOUNT	LOCATION	DEVICE
a minute ago	15	13	✓ Login Success	miguelangeljucca@msn.com miguelangeljucca@msn.com	Norway Bryne, Rogaland	macOS 10.15.7 Chrome 110.0.0.0

Fraud Signals



Why do we care?

- Detecting and preventing account fraud is **hard** with generic solutions
 - ITDR solutions are **account centric**
 - Some threats & attacks are hard to detect without this focus
 - Detection **speed** is key to reduce business impact
- Loss of ... fill it in
 - **revenue** (e.g. promotion abuse, sharing services)
 - **customer satisfaction** (e.g. account takeover, noisy neighbor)
 - **brand reputation** (e.g. leaked PII)
- Identity is the new perimeter
 - cloud computing - explosion of hosted services
 - work from home - another threat vector
 - BYOD

User Account Security is *broken* and *unsustainable*

61%

of all breaches
exploit user
accounts



User Accounts are
Fastest Growing
Attack Vector

3.3x

attack frequency
increasing
annually


\$4.8M

average cost of a successful
attack in 2024

292 days

average time from detection
to remediation


What is an identity?



User types

- Detection and prevention configuration may also depend on the user type
- Examples:
 - students, parents, staff at a school district
 - buyers, sellers, operators at a marketplace vendor
 - employees, contractors, and maybe executives at a traditional enterprise
- Different types
 - different behaviors
 - access patterns including location, time of day, time of week, frequency
 - devices, device types may differ


User behaviors



- Locations
 - also weekday vs. weekend
- ISPs, VPNs used
- Circadian rhythm
 - also weekday vs. weekend
- Number of events
- User agents
 - versions


Circadian Rhythm

Hourly activity, averaged over 30 days before the last seen event



Location History

Activity over 30 days before the last seen event




Other facets

- Entity types
 - managed vs. unmanaged
 - human vs. non-human / AI agent
- Business context
 - normal vs. unexpected
 - CIAM vs. Enterprise
 - different applications - different contexts
 - single vs. multiple Identity Providers


What concerns does ITDR address?

- **ITDR: Identity Threat Detection & Response**
- **Threat detection:**
 - ITDR solutions monitor user activity and access patterns to identify suspicious behavior that may indicate a threat.
- **Threat investigation:**
 - When a threat is detected, ITDR systems help investigate the incident, including identifying the source, scope, and impact.
- **Threat response:**
 - ITDR solutions can automate responses to threats, such as blocking access, disabling accounts, or alerting security teams.
- **With a focus on identity:**
 - Unlike other threat detection and response solutions (EDR, XDR, MDR), ITDR specifically focuses on the identity domain, which is often the entry point for many cyberattacks.



ITDR Illustrated

Modern cybercriminal tools & tactics circumvent traditional IAM prevention



Source: Gartner

Note: IOC = Indicator of compromise

765882_C

Gartner®


- Detect indicators of attack by monitoring for TTPs
- Detect the moment an account is compromised by knowing what is normal for every user

Endpoint Detection & Response vs. ITDR

	EDR	ITDR
Scope	monitor, secure endpoints	identity-based threats across platforms, environments, systems
Data collected	process execution, file access, network traffic	user activity logs, access management logs
Threat visibility	endpoint activities, user devices	identity-based threats, privileged user behavior, access attempts, auth patterns
Incident response	threats at endpoint level	user behaviors across environments

Contrasting ITDR and XDR/EDR

TYPICAL ATTACK SEQUENCE



Cybercriminals Don't Break In, They Log In



Credential
Stuffing



Account
Takeover



Session
Sharing



Stolen
Credentials



Brute Force
Attacks



MFA Fatigue
Attack



Suspicious
IPs



Insider
Threats



Unusual Device
Use



Impossible
Travel




Circadian
Rhythm



MFA Location
Mismatch



Detection, Prevention, Response



Prevention - Example




Sign up
attempt




Application

Risky?
Location, ToD,
Device, etc.




ITDR



Deny

Deny
Challenge
Allow



Preventing

- Rules to block unwanted traffic, allowing legitimate traffic
- Goldilock principle
 - block too much - lose potential legitimate business
 - block too little - business loss due to illegitimate activities
- Going beyond allow/deny
 - step-up authentication (e.g. MFA)
 - prompting (e.g. CAPTCHA)

☰ Set Outcome → DENY IF

☰ Lists *is* Banned Networks


☰ Set Outcome → CHALLENGE IF

🕒 Event Anomaly Score *greater than or equal to* 75

☰ Set Outcome → DENY IF

⚠ Risk *is* Outlier Account

Detection - Example



Detection - Analogy

Without ITDR

With ITDR



Detection - Phases

User Actions

1. Log in
2. Use App
3. (sometimes)
change password
change email
4. (maybe) log out

Application Logs Events

ITDR Processes Events


- Event enrichment
 - IP - location, country, VPN,
 - Email - breach, free/business
 - User Agent - obsolete, bot
 - Phone - DNO
- Building profile, trends
 - unusual in context
- Detecting emerging threats



Image credit: Reddit

Responding

- Playbooks
 - manual / automated
- Actions
 - blocking, suspending users, sessions
 - revising prevention rules



Threats vs. Risks

- Risks ~ events that could possibly indicate malicious behavior
 - IP is a Tor exit node
 - IP was involved in malicious activity
 - IP is not residential IP (and not a VPN)
 - Email is disposable
 - Email appears in a breach
 - User agent is obsolete
 - User agent is a bot
 - etc.

Impossible Travel Occurred



Zenica, Federation of B&H, Bosnia and Herzegovina
→ New York City, New York, United States
19,646 mph (4,441 mi)

Risk Score



Anomaly Score



Signals

Account Sharing

Impossible Travel

Breached

Invalid A Record

Invalid DNS

Invalid SPF Record

Hosted

VPN

Threats vs. Risks - cont'd

- Threats ~ specific, identified attacks on accounts / identities
 - account takeover
 - impossible travel
 - credential stuffing
 - session sharing
 - MFA location mismatch
 - multiple accounts
 - etc.

Threat: Impossible Travel

- Definition
 - successful subsequent authentication events from separate locations that is impossible for the same person to execute
- Challenges:
 - location accuracy
 - VPN use
 - Relays (iCloud, Edge VPN)
 - even on same physical device - Safari vs. non-Safari
 - there is a 3rd dimension
- Cause:
 - likely leaked or breached credentials

Threat: Credential Stuffing

- Definition
 - many failed login attempts - and few successful - typically in a short period of time from a small set of locations against a large number of accounts
- Challenges:
 - large volume of events
- And:
 - could lead to account takeover
 - could also trip impossible travel alerts

Threat: Credential Stuffing

Dec 31 - Credential Stuffing Attack

Credential Stuffing

12/31/2024 3:50:18 AM - 1/2/2025 10:25:26 PM

Accounts

5

TAKEOVERS

3,892,910

NONEXISTENT ACCOUNTS

ATTACK ORIGINATION

462,535 IPs across 107 countries


ATTACK SIZE & SCOPE

3,897,221 attempts in 2 days, 18 hr, 35 min, 8 sec

Total Events

4,306

FAILED TAKEOVERS



SEE MORE

RESOLVE ✓

Threat: Session Sharing

- Definition
 - limited validity access tokens shared between multiple users likely at different locations to access the same application
- How?
 - Chrome Extensions exist to facilitate this (or just use Chrome DevTools)
- Why?
 - circumvent login restrictions

Session Sharing: leste[REDACTED]

ACCOUNT

 leste[REDACTED]@gmail.com
auth0[REDACTED]

SESSION

 5zkD6Bo3mZ4p4NQCT5BjD[REDACTED]

Session Sharing

DETECTED 4/17/2025 11:26:17 AM

REASON

Multiple instances of **impossible travel** and **device changes** throughout the life of the session.

Other Detection Techniques

- **Device fingerprinting**
 - browsers - may require browser extensions or custom libraries
 - not limited to browsers
- **Honeypots**
 - cheap way to detect malicious activity
- **Canary Accounts**
 - for example, a user who should never be seen in production

Surprises

- The share of automated traffic on the internet (~half)
- Amount of traffic from IPv6 addresses
 - some 5G ISPs only use IPv6
 - size of IPv6 networks assigned to end users
- Windows XP is still used
- Lookalike domains: smilesllc@outlokk.com

Just for Fun

- Default prefix length of IPv6 networks?
- Homoglyphs
 - charlie@someagency.com - can you spot the homoglyph?
- Can you guess the application using this user agent string?

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_1)

AppleWebKit/601.2.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.0.1

Safari/601.2.4 facebookexternalhit/1.1 Facebot Twitterbot/1.0

Answers

- Default prefix length of IPv6 networks?
 - /64 (!)
- Homoglyphs
 - charlie@someagency.com - can you see it now?: **charlie@someagency.com**
- Can you guess the application using this user agent string?
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_1)
AppleWebKit/601.2.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.0.1
Safari/601.2.4 facebookexternalhit/1.1 Facebookbot Twitterbot/1.0

The answer: **Messages app on iOS**

Resources

- NIST Cybersecurity Framework - <https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework>
- Newsletters
 - Risky Business - risky.biz
 - TL;DR security - tldrsec.com
- T-Pot honeypot - <https://github.com/telekom-security/tpotce>
- Homoglyph fun - <https://www.dcode.fr/homoglyphs-homographs-generator>



Thank You

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